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Abstract
In this paper I investigate the properties of social welfare functions defined on domains
where the preferences of one agent remain fixed. Such a domain is a degenerate
case of those investigated, and proved Arrow consistent, by Sakai and Shimoji (Soc
Choice Welf 26(3):435–445, 2006). Thus, they admit functions from them to a social
preference that satisfy Arrow’s conditions of Weak Pareto, Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, and Non-dictatorship. However, I prove that according to any function
that satisfies these conditions on such a domain, for any triple of alternatives, if the
agent with the fixed preferences does not determine the social preference on any pair
of them, then some other agent determines the social preference on the entire triple.
Keywords Social choice · Arrow · Fixed preferences · Restricted domains
1 Introduction andmotivation
Social choice theory in the Arrovian style concerns functions from domains containing
n-tuples of orders over some set of alternatives that map to an overall order on those
alternatives. Arrow’s conditions of Weak Pareto (WP), Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA), and Non-dictatorship (ND) put constraints on the behaviour these
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functions, whilst the Universal Domain (UD) condition specifies their domain. Arrow
(1963) proved that these conditions are not jointly satisfiable.
It is well known that UD is stronger than is needed to generate the impossibility
result, but also well known that various restricted domains admit functions satisfy-
ing the remaining conditions (Gaertner 2001; Breton and Weymark 2011). In this
paper, I investigate domains where the preferences of one individual are fixed, and the
rest are allowed to vary. These domains are degenerate cases of domains containing
what Sakai and Shimoji (2006) call a ‘dichotomous’ preference. An individual has a
‘dichotomous’ preference in their sense if the alternatives under consideration can be
partitioned into two subsets, such that the individual in question prefers every element
of one of the subsets over every element of the other, across the domain of the aggrega-
tion function. Clearly, if an individual has a fixed preference across the domain of the
aggregation function, they have a dichotomous preference (unless of course their fixed
preference is complete indifference). These domains do admit social welfare functions
satisfying the remaining Arrovian conditions (Sakai and Shimoji 2006, Theorem 1),
and thus, domains including a fixed preference are guaranteed to be Arrow consistent
by the same result.
However, I prove here that according to any function on such a domain that satisfies
WP, IIA, and ND, for any triple of alternatives, if the agent with the fixed preferences
does not determine the social preference on any pair of them, then some other agent
determines the social preference on the entire triple. Thus, the cost of accommodating
varying social preferences over pairs of alternatives (varying in the sense of allowing
disagreement with the agent with fixed preferences) is paid only by making some other
agent determine the social preference over them across the domain. Equivalently, for
any triple of alternatives, if the social ordering is to be sensitive to more than one
agent’s preferences over them, then the fixed preference will always determine the
social preference of at least one pair within the triple. This prima facie undesirable
result suggests that the Arrovian consistency of such domains is guaranteed only at
the cost of the preferences of the agent with the fixed preferences having significant
influence on the social preference.
These domains are of interest for at least four reasons, each of them stemming
from motivations for UD. When faced with a situation where an aggregation function
is required I take it that, as a matter of fact, each individual has a specific, actual,
preference ordering over the alternatives in question. Thus, there is only one actual
preference profile to be aggregated.
However, Arrow (1963, Chapters III and VIII) motivated UD by noting that our
knowledge about these preference might be incomplete. If we cannot rule out any
other profile this motivates UD.1 In response to this we can consider contexts where
the formal machinery of social choice theory is put to work in designing an actual
aggregation procedure (such as in the literature on mechanism design). Presumably
there exist scenarios where a social planner tasked with such a design problem may
also be a member of the group of individuals whose preferences need to be aggregated.
As long as she knows her own preferences in advance, then this undercuts the above
1 In the first edition of Social Choice and Individual Values Arrow’s Condition 1 only required that there
were are least three alternatives available such that every individual could order those three alternatives in
anyway. The second edition’s Condition 1’ strengthened this and is now the standard UD assumption.
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motivation for UD, because it requires that every individual may hold any possibly
ordering on the alternatives. Domains where the social planner’s preferences are held
fixed, and the other individuals’ preferences vary, correspond to the domains discussed
in this paper.
An alternative motivation for UD that applies beyond mechanism design—
including, for example, cases, where the machinery of social choice theory is used
to investigate issues concerning justice—is offered by Kolm (1996) (whose views are
usefully discussed by Weymark (2011)). Even if it is the case that in the actual world
there is only once preference profile to be aggregated, whether or not the aggregation
procedure is just depends on its counterfactual behaviour: what would have resulted
had the individuals’ preferences been otherwise. This corresponds to the behaviour of
an aggregation function when applied to different preference profiles. If every indi-
vidual involved could have had any preference over the alternatives in question, then
this motivates UD. However, this might not always be the case. For some sets of alter-
natives, and for some individuals, their preferences may be such that they could not
but hold the preferences that they do. The sorts of cases I have in mind include, for
example, cases where the preferences of an individual are so central to their world view
that they could not be otherwise without the individual failing to be that individual
in question (this corresponds to the individual’s preferences over the alternatives in
question being one of what philosophers sometimes call their ‘essential properties’).
For example, for someone with strongly held religious beliefs, their preferences over
some set of alternatives pertaining to those beliefs might be such that they simply
could not hold different preferences without being a different person.
A third reason to think about these domains stems from a recent discussion in the
philosophy of science literature. Okasha (2011) suggests that the question of how sci-
entists should rationally choose between competing scientific theories (or models, or
hypotheses) can be modelled in the social choice framework.2 His argument is remark-
ably simple: take theoretical virtues—good-making features of scientific theories; like
accuracy/fit-with-data, simplicity, and scope—to provide (ordinal) ‘preference’ rank-
ings over the competing theories. The ranking by each virtue depends on how the
competing theories compare with respect to that virtue. Then treat the question of the-
ory choice as a question of coming up with a function from n-tuples of these orderings
to an all-things-considered ranking.3 Crucially, Okasha suggests that the Arrovian
conditions apply in such a context. If correct, Arrow’s impossibility result rules out
the possibility of rationally choosing between competing scientific theories in this
manner.4
2 I take it that his argument is supposed to be normative, not descriptive. Modelling the question of theory
choice using the tools of social choice theory provides a way of asking what an ideally rational scientist
should do when faced with competing scientific theories, rather than what an actual scientist does do.
3 As such the phrase ‘theory choice’ is something of a misnomer, since Okasha works in the framework of
aggregating to an ordering rather than a choice function.
4 Okasha’s paper has generated numerous responses and discussions (Morreau 2014, 2015; Rizza 2014;
Okasha 2015; Stegenga 2015; Gaertner and Wüthrich 2016; Bradley 2016; Marcoci and Nguyen 2019).
See also (Stegenga 2013; Cresto and Tajer 2019) for applications in the context of aggregating different
sources of evidence.
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Morreau (2015) argues against the applicability of UD in the theory choice context.
If we again assume that there is a fact of the matter as to how each theoretical virtue
ranks the competing theories, then again there is only one n-tuple to be aggregated.
However, in analogy to Kolm’s (1996) justification for UD in the social choice appli-
cation, the justification for using a particular aggregation function depends on the
behaviour of the function when augmented with different profiles, profiles of rankings
which might have been. In addition, in the context of theory choice, at least some
of the virtues, such as simplicity, might be unable to rank the competing alternatives
in the way other than the one that they, in fact, do. As Okasha (2015, p. 288) puts
it, simplicity ranks theories according to their ‘essential features’. If, as a matter of
fact, a given theory is simpler than a competing theory, then this is necessarily the
case. Notice that this need not be the case for all theoretical virtues. Some, such as
accuracy/fit-with-data, for example, could supply any ranking of the competing theo-
ries (where ‘could’ is read to indicate modal possibility). In his reply, Okasha admits
that he is ‘inclined to agree with Morreau’s claim that some criteria of theory choice,
such as simplicity, are rigid’ (2015, p. 288).
If they are right about this, then the appropriate domain of a function from rankings
of scientific theories by virtues is not UD, but one where at least one virtue—
i.e., simplicity—supplies a fixed order on the alternatives, whilst the others—i.e.,
accuracy/fit-with-data—vary (I sharpen this in the next section). However, Okasha
and Morreau disagree on the importance of this observation. Okasha claims that in
‘the absence of a proof that [such a domain] is Arrow consistent, the right conclusion
to draw is that we do not know whether an Arrovian impossibility result applies in
this case or not. There is an unresolved mathematical question here’ (2015, p. 290).
As it happens, that such domains are Arrow consistent follows from the fact that an
order fixed across such a domain is a degenerate case of a dichotomous order in the
sense of (Sakai and Shimoji 2006), so the question has been resolved. However, the
properties of the social welfare functions that satisfy the Arrovian conditions on such
domains have not been investigated.
Finally, we can consider how to model non-welfarist, or more strictly speaking,
mixed non-welfarist/welfarist, accounts of whether or not an aggregation function is
just. Recall that on the standard social choice model, each element in an n-tuple of
preferences to be aggregated is supposed to represent the preferences of an individ-
ual. Thus, whether or not an aggregation function is just depends solely on how it
aggregates individuals’ preferences involved (including what these might be in coun-
terfactual situations). This way of addressing questions of social justice is strictly
welfarist; the only relevant data concern the behaviour of an aggregation function
when fed with individual preferences. However, there is nothing essential to the social
choice framework that demands that the preferences within an n-tuple represent the
preferences of an individual agent. We could instead take such an element to represent
an objective comparison of the alternatives involved. If agreement with this objective
comparison were to be the sole criterion on which to measure whether an aggregation
function is just, as per a strictly non-welfarist account, then we would expect dictato-
rial (with respect to the objective comparison) functions to be just. However, mixed
non-welarist/welfarist accounts would allow considerations of the extent to which an
aggregation function delivered the objective comparison of the alternatives involved
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combined with the extent to which it matched the preferences of the individual agents
involved. Depending on the nature of the alternatives in question, and the objective
way of comparing them, it is plausible that the preference ranking representing the
objective comparison of the alternatives would stay fixed irrespective of the subjective
preferences of the individuals involved. Again, the domains of preferences considered
in this paper correspond to such domains.
To aid readability I use the terminology associated with the standard application
of the Arrovian framework throughout: I talk of ‘agents’, ‘individuals’, ‘preference
orderings’, ‘indifference classes’, and so on. However, given the above considerations,
it should be noted that the ‘preferences’ of an ‘agent’ or a ‘individual’ can represent the
way a scientific virtue or a objective comparison orders the alternatives. I first recap
Saki and Shimoji’s (2006) proof that the relevant domains admit functions satisfying
IIA, ND, and WP. I then prove that provided there are enough alternatives, every agent
can influence the value of such functions. I finally prove that according to any Arrow
consistent function on such a domain, for any triple of alternatives, if the agent with
the fixed preferences does not determine the social preference on any pair within the
triple, then some other agent determines the social preference over the entire triple.
Equivalently, for any triple of alternatives, if the social preference over them is not
to be determined by a single agent across the domain, then the agent with the fixed
preferences will determine the social preference over at least one pair from the triple
across the domain. Thus, the cost of accommodating varying social preferences over
pairs of alternatives is paid only by making agents with varying preferences determine
the social preference. I return to how these formal results should be interpreted in each
domain of application in the concluding section.
2 Formal Framework and Results
Let X denote a finite set of alternatives X = {a1, a2, . . . , am}, with variables x, y, z
ranging over X . Let N denote a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}; P be the
set of strict orders over X ; and R the set of weak orders over X . Each individual
i is associated with orderings in R. Let Ri and Pi denote the weak and strict parts
of the preference order of an individual i , respectively. The domains of interest are
{R1} × Rn−1, {P1} × Rn−1, and {P1} × Pn−1, i.e., domains, where the preference
order of agent 1 is fixed. Elements of these domains are profiles and are denoted by
α, β, γ, δ, . . .. The restriction of a profile α to a pair of alternatives x, y is denoted
by α|x,y . A social welfare function f is a function from a domain of profiles D to R.
When applied to a profile in D, the value of such a function is denoted by R, whose
strict part is denoted by P . Where necessary, these are subscripted by Greek letters
to indicate the particular profile they came from. The restriction of an ordering R to
a pair of alternatives x, y is denoted by R|x,y . Such a function f : D → R satisfies
the Arrovian conditions of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), Weak Pareto
(WP), and Non-dictatorship (ND) if and only if:
IIA For all profiles α, β ∈ D, and for all x, y ∈ X , if α|x,y = β|x,y , then
( f (α))|x,y = ( f (β))|x,y .
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WP For all profiles in D, and for all x, y ∈ X , if, for all i ∈ N , x Pi y, then xP y.
ND There is no i ∈ N , such that for all profiles in D, and all x, y ∈ X , if x Pi y,
then xP y.
For any domain D, if there exists a f : D → R, that satisfies IIA, WP, and ND, then
D is said to be Arrow consistent.
Theorem 1 Any domain of the form {R1} × Rn−1 is Arrow consistent, for any n ≥
2, |X | ≥ 3, and R1 ∈ R with at least two indifference classes.
Proof This follows from Sakai and Shimoji (2006, Theorem 1) by noting that R1 is a
dichotomous preference. It is demonstrated by the below remark. unionsq
Remark For any n ≥ 2, |X | ≥ 3, we can construct an f : ({R1}× Rn−1) → R which
satisfies IIA, WP, and ND.5
Proof First notice that if R1 is complete indifference over the alternatives in X , then
individual 1 is a trivial dictator, violating ND. Therefore, we assume that R1 contains
at least two indifference classes. This means that we can find a partition of X with the
following properties: X1 ∪ X2 = X , X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, for all x, y ∈ X , if x ∈ X1, y ∈ X2
then x P1 y. Notice that since |X | ≥ 3, then at least one of X1, X2 will contain at least
2 alternatives. Call that set Xi and the other X j (no assumption is made about the
cardinality of X j other than the fact it is nonempty).
Then, we can define a function f : ({R1} × Rn−1) → R as follows:
(i) For all x, y ∈ Xi : xRy ↔ x R2 y.
(ii) For all x, y ∈ X j : xRy ↔ x R1 y.
(iii) For all x ∈ Xi , y ∈ X j : xRy ↔ x R1 y.
f satisfies IIA, WP, and ND by construction. Moreover, it delivers a complete binary
relation on X . It remains to show that it delivers a transitive relation. We prove this
by reductio. Suppose there exists x, y, z ∈ X , such that xRy, yRz, and zPx . The
following situations are mutually exclusive and together exhaust the possibilities:
1. x, y, z ∈ Xi .
2. x, y, z ∈ X j .
3. x ∈ Xi , y, z ∈ X j .
4. y ∈ Xi , x, z ∈ X j .
5. z ∈ Xi , x, y ∈ X j .
5 This construction follows theirs, but was developed independently. It is a generalisation of a function
suggested by Wulf Gaertner and John Weymark to Samir Okaska, cited in Okasha (2015, fn. 6). It builds on
Fishburn’s (1976) discussion of ‘dictators on blocks’ of alternatives. Here, I restrict my focus to domains,
where only one agent has a fixed preference and the rest of the agents’ preferences vary across all of
R. Sakai and Shimoji (2006) prove results with multiple fixed preferences. It bears noting here that their
Theorem 2, which shows that in addition to satisfying IIA, WP, ND, there exist functions which satisfy
‘Anonymity’ (AN) (defined in the usual way by ensuring that social welfare functions act identically on
permuted profiles) requires the existence of what they call an ‘isolated individual’, one whose preferences
always disagree with any other individual’s (and thus, there does not exist a permutation on profiles, making
AN vacuous), or that there exists a ‘dichotomous net’ on the domain, which requires for every triple of
alternatives some agent with a fixed preference over those alternatives. These do not seem to match the
motivations for considering a single fixed agent, as given in Sect. 1.
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6. x, y ∈ Xi , z ∈ X j .
7. x, z ∈ Xi , y ∈ X j .
8. y, z ∈ Xi , x ∈ X j .
By f ’s conditions i and ii, and the fact that Xi ∩ X j = ∅, there will no intransitivity
in cases 1 and 2. In cases 3 and 8 by the definitions of Xi and X j , we know that either
x P1 y, x P1z or y P1x, z P1x . By iii that means xPz in the former case, and yPx in the
latter. Both contradict our reductio assumption. In cases 4 and 7 by the definitions of
Xi and X j , we know either y P1x, y P1z, or x P1 y, z P1 y. By iii that means yPx in the
former case, and zP y in the latter. Both contradict our reductio assumption. In cases
5 and 6 by the definitions of Xi and X j , we know either z P1x, z P1 y, or x P1z, y P1z.
By iii that means zP y in the former case, and xPz in the latter. Both contradict our
reductio assumption. This exhausts all of the possible cases so f is guaranteed to
deliver a transitive result. unionsq
One might worry that no agent other than 1 or 2 has any effect on the value of the
function. A way of capturing this worry is to place an additional constraint on such
functions:
Liberalism (L) For every agent i ∈ N , there exists a pair (x, y) ∈ X2, with
x 
= y, such that if x Pi y, then xP y, and if y Pi x , then yPx
(Sen 1970, p. 153).
We can now prove that, providing that there are enough alternatives and that the agent,
whose preferences are fixed strictly orders them, there exist functions that satisfy IIA,
WP, and ND, which additionally satisfy L.
Theorem 2 For any n ≥ 2, |X | ≥ 2n − 1, and P1 ∈ P, there exists a function
f : ({P1} × Rn−1) → R that satisfies IIA, WP, ND, and L.
Proof Assume there are n agents. Since |X | ≥ 2n − 1 and the fixed agent provides a
strict ordering6 we can partition X into n equivalence classes as follows:
⋃n
i=1 Xi = X ;
for each Xi , X j 
=i , Xi ∩ X j = ∅; |X1| = 1; |Xi 
=1| = 2; and for each Xi , X j and
x, y ∈ X , if i > j and x ∈ X j and y ∈ Xi , then x P1 y. This partition takes the top
element of agents 1’s ranking and places it in X1, the second and third elements are in
X2, the fourth and fifth in X3, and so on, until reaching Xn , which will contain (at least
2 of) agent 1’s least preferred alternatives. Now, define a function f : ({P1}×Rn−1) →
R as follows:
(i) For all Xi and x, y ∈ Xi : xRy ↔ x Ri y,
(ii) For all Xi , X j 
=i and x ∈ Xi and y ∈ X j : xRy ↔ x P1 y,
f satisfies IIA, WP, and ND by construction. Since the partition constructed contains
n equivalence classes, i ensures that it satisfies L. As before, the value of f is com-
plete and it remains to show that it is transitive. Suppose not. Then, there are some
alternatives x, y, z ∈ X , such that xRy, yRz, and zPx . In this instance, it cannot
be the case that all three are in the same equivalence class of the partition (since no
6 The below proof could be run using more alternatives and a fixed weak order, provided that it contained
enough indifference classes with at least two elements.
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Xi 
=n contains more than two alternatives, and the social ordering over alternatives in
Xn is guaranteed to be transitive by (i) and the fact that agent n supplies a transitive
preference), so the following cases are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive:
1. There exists distinct Xi , X j , such that x ∈ Xi and y, z ∈ X j .
2. There exists distinct Xi , X j , such that y ∈ Xi and x, z ∈ X j .
3. There exists distinct Xi , X j , such that z ∈ Xi and x, y ∈ X j .
4. There exists distinct Xi , X j , and Xk , such that x ∈ Xi , y ∈ X j , z ∈ Xk .
In case 4, by f ’s condition ii, the social order of the alternatives will match agent
1’s order over the alternatives, and since agent 1 provided a transitive preference order,
there can be no intransitivity here. In case 1, suppose that i > j , then y P1x by the
construction of the partition and, therefore, yPx by f ’s condition ii, contradicting the
reduction assumption that xRy. Alternatively suppose j > i , then x P1z and xPz,
contradicting the reductio assumption that zPx . In case 2, if i > j , then z P1 y, so
zP y: contradiction. If j > i , then y P1x , so yPx : contradiction. In case 3, if i > j ,
then x P1z, so xPz and if j > i , then z P1 y, so zP y by the same reasoning. Both cases
contradict the reductio assumption. Since this exhausts the cases, f cannot deliver an
intransitive relation. unionsq
Theorems 1 and 2 show that by fixing the preference order by one agent both Arrow’s
impossibility result, and Sen’s (1970) impossibility of the Paretian liberal result, can
be avoided. However, they do so utilising aggregation functions that allow the fixed
agent to determine the ‘overall’ structure of the aggregate order, and allowing other
agents to ‘fill in the gaps’. An interesting question is whether any Arrow consistent
function on such a domain has to be this way. We can prove that something very like
this has to be the case. To do so, it is useful to define the following notions: an agent i
is weakly decisive on an ordered pair (x, y) ∈ X2 if and only if in all profiles, where
x Pi y, xP y. An agent who is weakly decisive on (x, y) and (y, x) is said to be decisive
on {x, y}. Finally, an agent i is pivotal at a profile α = (R1, . . . , Rm) if and only if
there exists a profile β = (R′1, . . . , R′m), such that R j = R′j for all j 
= i , Ri 
= R′i ,
and f (α) 
= f (β) (Barberá 1980).
Theorem 3 For any n ≥ 2, |X | ≥ 3, and P1 ∈ P, and function f : ({P1}×Pn−1) → R
that satisfies IIA and WP: for any triple of distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X, if agent 1
is not decisive on any pair from those alternatives, then there exists an agent who is
decisive on all of them.
Proof We prove the theorem by assuming that f satisfies IIA and WP. Without loss
of generality choose a triple of distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X such that x P1 y P1z.
We assume that agent 1 is not decisive on any pair of those alternatives to show that
some agent i is decisive on all of them. The proof proceeds in six steps.7 Step 1 shows
that there exists a pivotal agent i at some profile β. Step 2 shows that i is weakly
decisive on the pair (x, y). Step 3 shows that i is weakly decisive on (y, x), thereby
establishing that i is decisive on {x, y}. Step 4 shows that i is also decisive on {x, z}.
Step 5 shows that the same process delivers an agent j who is decisive on {y, z}. Step
6 shows that i = j .
7 The strategy in steps 1–5 is similar to Yu’s (2012) proof of Arrow’s Theorem, which is in turn based upon
the third proof from Geanakoplos (2005).
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Step 1. As agent 1 is not decisive on any pair from {x, y, z}, and 1 is trivially weakly
decisive on the pair (z, y), we know that there exists a profile α, such that zRy. Order
the agents, as displayed below (Fig. 1). Now, one by one from the right of the line
onwards, perform a pairwise reversal on the preferences over y and z for each agent
who prefers z to y. By WP, at some point in this process, we will arrive at a profile,
where yPz, and where no further pairwise reversals of the preferences of agents later
in the sequence will change this. Call the agent who induced the (final) switch i . This
provides the profiles β and γ (Figs. 2, 3). This suffices to show that i is pivotal at β
(and γ ).
Step 2. We now show that i is weakly decisive on (x, y). Insert x directly above y in
γ for each agent 
= 1, and for 1 we know that x P1 y P1z. This delivers a profile δ (Fig.
4). By WP, xPδ y. By IIA and the fact that δ|y,z = γ |y,z, yPδz. So by transitivity we
Fig. 1 α : zRy 1 ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... y z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... z y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 2 β : zRy 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... y z z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... z y y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 3 γ : yPz 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... y y z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... z z y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 4 δ : xP yPz 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... x x ... ... ...
y ... y y z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... x ... x
z ... z z y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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have xPδz. Now, rearrange the preferences over x, y of every agent 
= i, 1 as you like,
keeping their relative position with respect to z fixed. Raise z in i’s preference ranking,
such that: x Pi z Pi y. This delivers the profile  where each ? denotes a possible location
for x (Fig. 5). By IIA and |y,z = β|y,z, zR y. By IIA and |x,z = δ|x,z, xPz. By
transitivity, xP y. This holds for every way that x can be distributed across the question
marks, which exhausts all relative orders of x and y (where x Pi y). By IIA, this makes
i weakly decisive on (x, y).
Step 3. We now show that i is weakly decisive on (y, x) and, therefore, decisive on
{x, y}. Since agent 1 is assumed not to be decisive on {x, y} and is trivially weakly
decisive on (y, x), there must exist a profile ζ , such that yRζ x . Distribute x around
(i.e., directly above or below) y in β for all agents 
= 1, so the relative ordering of x
and y in the result matches ζ . This gives the profile η, where the † indicates a possible
location for x (Fig. 6). By IIA and ζ |y,x = η|y,x , yRηx . By IIA β|y,z = η|y,z, zRη y.
By transitivity zRηx .
Now, raise y above z in i’s preference ranking and rearrange the relative ranking of
x and y as you like for all agents other that 1 and i . This delivers the profile θ (Fig. 7).
By IIA and θ |y,z = γ |y,z, yPθ z. By IIA and θ |x,z = η|x,z, zPθ x . By transitivity yPθ x .
This holds for every way that x can be distributed across the question marks, which
exhausts all relative orders of x and y (where y Pi x). By IIA, this makes i weakly
decisive on (y, x). Which combined with the fact that i is weakly decisive on (x, y)
makes i decisive on {y, x}.
Fig. 5  : xPzP y 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ? x ... ... ...
y ... y z z ... z
... ... ? y ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ? ... ?
z ... z ... y ... y
... ... ... ... ? ... ?
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 6 η : zRyRx 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... † ... ... ... ...
... ... y z z ... z
y ... † ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... † † ... †
z ... z y y ... y
... ... ... † † ... †
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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Fig. 7 θ : yPzRx 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ? y ... ... ...
... ... y z z ... z
y ... ? ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ? ? ... ?
z ... z ? y ... y
... ... ... ... ? ... ?
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 8 ι : xPzRy 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... x x ... x
x ... y z z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... x ... ... ... ...
z ... z y y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 9 κ : xP yPz 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... x ? ... ?
x ... y y z ... z
... ... ... z ? ... ?
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ? ... ... ... ...
z ... z ... y ... y
... ... ? ... ... ... ...
Step 4. We now show that i is decisive on {x, z} using the same technique as above.
For all agents 
= 1 insert x directly above z in β to deliver the profile ι (Fig. 8). Since
ι|z,y = β|z,y, zRιy. By WP, xPιz. By transitivity xPιy. Now, raise y above z in i’s
preference ranking and rearrange the relative ranking of x and z as you like for all
other that 1 and i . This delivers the profile κ (Fig. 9). By IIA and κ|x,y = ι|x,y, xPκ y.
By IIA and κ|y,z = γ |y,z, yPκ z. By transitivity xPκ z. This holds for each way that x
can be distributed across the question marks, which exhausts all relative orders of x
and z (where x Pi z). By IIA this makes i weakly decisive on (x, z).
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Fig. 10 μ : yPzRx 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... † ... †
x ... y y z ... z
... ... ... ... † ... †
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... † † y ... y
... ... z z ... ... ...
... ... † † ... ... ...
z ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 11 ν : zRyPz 1 ... i ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... z ? ... ?
x ... y y z ... z
... ... ... ... ? ... ?
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... ? ... y ... y
... ... z ? ... ... ...
... ... ? ? ... ... ...
z ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
We now show that i is weakly decisive on (z, x). Since we are assuming that agent
1 is not decisive on any pair from {x, y, z}, and 1 is trivially weakly decisive on (z, x),
to avoid 1 being decisive on {x, z}, there must exist a profile λ, where zRλx . Distribute
x directly above or below z in γ to match the relative order of x and y in λ which
delivers a profile μ, where the † denotes a possible location for x (Fig. 10). By IIA and
λ|z,x = μ|z,x , zRμx . By IIA and γ |z,y = μ|z,y, yPμz. By transitivity yPμx . Now,
raise z above y in i’s preference ranking and rearrange the relative ranking of x and
z as you like for all other that 1 and i . This delivers the profile ν (Fig. 11). By IIA
and ν|x,y = μ|x,y, yPνx . By IIA and ν|y,z = β|y,z, zRν y. By transitivity zPνx . This
holds for each way that x can be distributed across the question marks, which exhausts
all relative orders of x and z (where z Pi x). By IIA this makes i weakly decisive on
(z, x), which combined with the previous result means that i is decisive on {z, x}.
Step 5. We now show that there is an agent j who is decisive on {y, z}. We proceed
in similar manner to the above. First, to avoid agent 1 being decisive on {y, x}, there
must exist a profile, where yRx . Order the agents, so that those to the left prefer x
to y, and those to the right prefer y to x . Perform the same pairwise switch process
as occurred in step 1. By WP, we know that at some point in this process, we reach
xP y, where no further pairwise reversals later in the sequence will change this. This
provides the profiles ξ and o (Figs. 12, 13). Insert z directly below y for all 
= 1 in o,
and we know that y P1z. This delivers the profile π (Fig. 14), such that π |x,y = o|x,y ,
so by IIA xPπ y, and yPπ z by WP, so xPπ z by transitivity. Now, keeping their relative
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Fig. 12 ξ : yRx 1 ... j ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x y y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... y x x ... x
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 13 o : xP y 1 ... j ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x x y ... y
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
y ... y y x ... x
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 14 π : xP yPz 1 ... j ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x x y ... y
... ... ... ... z ... z
y ... y y ... ... ...
... ... z z x ... x
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 15 μ : yRxPz 1 ... j ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x y ? ... ?
... ... ... x y ... y
y ... ? ... ? ... ?
... ... y z ... ... ...
... ... ? ... x ... ...
z ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
ranks with respect to x fixed, arbitrarily rearrange the ranking of y, z for every agent
(other than j and 1), and raise y over x in j’s ranking. This delivers the profile μ again
the ?s denote possible locations of z (Fig. 15). By IIA and μ|x,y = ξ |x,y, yRμx . By
IIA and μ|x,z = π |x,z, xPμz. So by transitivity, yPμz. This holds for every way that
z can be distributed across the question marks, which exhausts all relative orders of z
and y (where y Pj z). By IIA, this makes j weakly decisive on (y, z).
We now show that there exists a agent k 
= 1 who is weakly decisive on (z, y).
Since agent 1 is trivially weakly decisive on (z, x), to avoid agent 1 being decisive on
{z, x}, there must exist a profile σ , where zRσ x . Perform the same ordering procedure
and pairwise switching of x and z, and by WP, we know that the two profiles τ and υ
exist (Figs. 16, 17). Since agent 1 is trivially weakly decisive on (z, y) to avoid agent 1
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Fig. 16 τ : zRx 1 ... k ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x z z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... z x x ... x
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 17 υ : xPz 1 ... k ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x x z ... z
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
z ... z z x ... x
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 18 χ : xPzRy 1 ... k ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x x † ... †
... ... ... ... z ... z
... ... ... ... † ... †
y ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... † † x ... x
... ... z z ... ... ...
z ... † † ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fig. 19 ψ : zRxP y 1 ... k ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
x ... x z ? ... ?
... ... ... x z ... z
... ... ... ... ? ... ?
y ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ? ... x ... x
... ... z ? ... ... ...
z ... ? ? ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
being decisive on {z, y}, there must exist a profile φ, where zRφ y. Introduce y directly
above or below z for all 
= 1 in υ, so that the relative order of y and z matches that of
φ to construct the profile χ , where the † denotes a possible location for y (Fig. 18).
By IIA and χ |y,z = φ|y,z, zRχ y. By IIA and χ |x,z = υ|x,z, xPχ z. Therefore, by
transitivity xPχ y. Now, keeping their relative ranks with respect to x fixed, arbitrarily
rearrange the ranking of y, z for every agent (other than k and 1), and raise z over
x in k’s ranking. This delivers the profile ψ , again the ? denotes possible locations
of y (Fig. 19). By IIA and ψ |x,y = χ |x,y, xPψ y. By IIA and ψ |x,z = τ |x,z, zRτ x .
Therefore, by transitivity, zPμy. This holds for every way that y can be distributed
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across the question marks, which exhausts all relative orders of z and y (where z Pk y).
By IIA, this makes k weakly decisive on (z, y).
Since j is weakly decisive on (y, z); k is weakly decisive on (z, y); and neither j
nor k are identical to agent 1 (by the construction of profiles ξ and τ ), we also show
that j = k. Suppose not. Then, there exists a profile ω, such that y Pi z and z Pj y. By
their weak decisiveness on their respective ordered pairs, we have yPωz and zPωy.
Contradiction, therefore, j = k.
Step 6. Finally, we show that i = j which completes the proof. Suppose that i 
= j .
Then, since i 
= 1 and j 
= 1, there exists a profile , where y Pi x Pi z and z Pj y.
Since i is decisive on {x, y} and {x, z}, yPx, xPz so by transitivity yPz. Since j
is decisive on {y, z}, zP y. Contradiction. Therefore, i = j .
Since x, y, z were chosen arbitrarily, this shows that for any triple of distinct alter-
natives in X , if 1 is not decisive on any pair, then some other agent is decisive on all
pairs from those alternatives. unionsq
Theorem 3 has an almost immediate corollary that any function satisfying the
Arrovian conditions on a domain of the form {P1} × Pn−1 must be, such that agent 1
is decisive on at least one pair of alternatives.
Corollary 3.1 For any n ≥ 2, |X | ≥ 3, and P1 ∈ P, if a function f : ({P1}×Pn−1) →
R satisfies IIA, WP, and ND, then agent 1 is decisive on at least one pair of alternatives
from X.
Proof Assume that f : ({P1} × Pn−1) → R satisfies IIA, and WP. Assume that agent
1 is not decisive on any pair of alternatives in X to show that f violates ND.
We prove this by induction on the set of alternatives. For the base case, we have an
agent i 
= 1 who is decisive on all pairs from {a1, a2, a3} by Theorem 3. For the induc-
tive step, we show that if i is decisive on all pairs from {a1, . . . , an}, then i is decisive on
all pairs from {a1, . . . , an, an+1}. Assume that i decisive on all pairs from {a1, . . . , an}.
Then, i is decisive on the pair {an−1, an}. Consider the triple {an−1, an, an+1}. By
Theorem 3 and the assumption that 1 is not decisive on any pair in X , there exists an
agent j 
= 1 who is decisive on all pairs from this triple. Therefore, j is decisive on
{an−1, an}. However, i = j for the same reason as given at the end of step 5 in the
previous proof. Therefore, i is also decisive on all pairs from {an−1, an, an+1} which
means i is decisive on all pairs from {a1, . . . , an, an+1}, since if i 
= 1 is decisive on a
pair {x, y} and a pair {y, z}, then i is decisive on {x, z} (otherwise, there would exist
a profile, where zRx , but also x Pi y Pi z which would deliver xP y, yPz by i’s deci-
siveness on (x, y) and (y, z), which by transitivity would deliver xPz; contradiction).
This suffices to establish that i is a dictator, which proves the corollary. unionsq
3 Concluding discussion
Theorems 1 and 2 demonstrate that domains of profiles constructed by holding the
preferences of one agent fixed are Arrow consistent. The functions used to demon-
strate this result had the prima facie undesirable property of using the preferences
of the fixed agent to determine the ‘overall’ structure of the aggregate ordering, and
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allowing the agents with varying preferences to ‘fill in the gaps’. Theorem 3 showed
that any function satisfying IIA, WP, and ND on such domains had to be such that if
the agent with the fixed preferences does not determine the social preference of any
pair of alternatives within an arbitrary triple, some other agent determines the social
preference over the entire triple across the domain. Alternatively, by contraposition,
for any triple of alternatives, if the social preference over them is not to be deter-
mined by a single agent across the domain, then the agent with the fixed preferences
will determine the social preference over at least one pair from the triple across the
domain. Thus, the influence on the social preference over pairs in a triple of alterna-
tives is distributed between the agent with the fixed preference and some other agent.
It is worth considering whether there are any instances, where such functions could
be used reasonably.
It seems that they cannot in the standard context of aggregating the preferences
of individuals. There is no obvious reason to privilege the agent with the fixed pref-
erence, and nor is it desirable for an arbitrary triple of alternatives to allow another
agent determine the social preference on them. It is an open question as to whether
a hybrid welfarist/non-welfarist account of social justice could be developed in view
of the restrictions Theorem 3 highlights. However, it is not implausible that there are
some cases of social choice where one might want to use some objective criterion
to determine the ‘overall’ social ordering whilst still giving individuals freedom to
determine the respective orderings within the ‘gaps’ in the manner of the functions
defined above.
Such functions are more reasonable in the case of aggregating the ‘preferences’
of theoretical virtues over competing scientific theories to an all-things-considered
ranking of them. Okasha (2011, p. 98) considers a possible ‘empiricist’ response the
problem he posed. The empiricist might claim that accuracy/fit-with-data should be a
dictator, thereby rejecting ND in this context. I think that Okasha is right to dismiss
this response on the grounds that such an approach faces the ‘problem of over-fitting’
(Forster and Sober 1994): the idea is that our data contain noise, and if we always prefer
the theory that best fits the data, then we may be led to preferring radically complicated
theories that have been generated precisely to match noise. Theorems 1 and 2 provide
the empiricist with a solution. If the noise-matching theories are too complex, then they
appear further down in the ranking provided by simplicity. Partitioning the ranking
supplied by simplicity, and defining the appropriate aggregation function using this
partition, will then ensure that they appear further down in the all-things-considered
ranking. The empiricist is then free to claim that accuracy should determine the ranking
of the remaining alternatives.
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